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Closed head trauma is a serious yet relatively misunderstood injury 
to the brain. Though concussions and contusions occur typically without 
laceration to the head, both usually cause severe jarring of the brain 
substance within the skull. Consequently, there is likely to be diffuse 
dama·ge to the neural tissue not easily detected by merely viewing the in-
jured individual. Those who survive a closed head injury may show lit-
tle or no impairment of higher cortical functions with minor injuries or 
a gross deterioration of intellect and personality with more severe dam-
age (Walsh, 1978). However, aJ 1 closed head injuries, even in cases with 
associated depressed ~kull fractures, hemiplegia, aphasia, or other 
clearly focal signs, result in diffuse and bilateral cerebral damage 
(Smith, 1981). A few of the possible complications of that damage in-
clude brain edema, intracranial pressure, subdural and extradural hema-
tomas, and systemic complications, i.e., hypotension, anemia, and hypoxia 
(Levin, Benton, & Grossman, 1982). 
Because of increased technological sophistication the likelihood of 
surviving a closed head injury has increased. Studies in both England 
and the United States have indicated that admission to hospitals for 
head injury have continued to increase over the past 20 years, but the 
number of resulting deaths has remained constant (Levin et al ., 1982). 
About one-half of all closed head trauma in adults and adolescents in the 
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United States is caused by traffic accidents (Annegers, Grabow, Kurland, 
& Laws, 1980; Kalsbeek, McLaurin, Harris, & Miller, 1980). Age appears 
to be related to injury with young adults and late adolescents usually 
injured as occupants of motor vehicles while children and elderly people 
are usually involved in falls and pedestrian-car accidents (Levin et al., 
1982). It has also been found that young adult males, typically 15 to 
30 years of age, predominate as victims of closed head injury (Annegers 
et al ., 1980). Those who survive and recover to some extent from closed 
head trauma wi11 often seek legal action and/or will file insurance 
claims to receive monetary compensation for their injuries. 
In many instances involving 1 itigation or insurance claims, neuro-
logical evidence of brain damage can be provided {i.e., X-rays, PET or 
CAT scans, or surgical procedures) leaving no doubt that the individual 
should be compensated. However, in situations where weaknesses 1 inger 
without a clear physical basis, a means to document change which would go 
beyond the capabilities of the neurologist or neurosurgeon has been need-
ed. Even when there is clear evidence of damage, itseffect ontheperson•s 
ability to function needs to be evaluated, As Luria (cited by Christensen, 
1975) noted, the clinical examination of the neurologist concentrating on 
the disturbances in sensibility, movement, muscle tone, and reflexes re-
flects the pathology of a very small portion of the cortex and the ner-
vous system, the primary projection areas. But lesions outside those 
areas, in the secondary and tertiary zones which make up a large part of 
the cerebral cortex, are unavailable to the technique of the classical 
neurologist. If a diagnosis is necessary, the neurologist must examine 
the patient•s behavior; he/she must use psychological methods of investi-
gation. With neuropsychological testing, residual effects of closed 
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head injury which could not be detected by EEG, PET, or CAT scan, for 
example, and could not be treated by surgery or chemotherapy, can be bet-
ter identified and evaluated. 
Based on these evaluations, psychologists are often required to tes-
tify in and outside of court as to the competency of the individual. 
Without hard neurological evidence, accuracy of diagnosis based on neuro-
psychological testing increases in importance. When one considers com-
pensation as an incentive for the patient to malinger (appear worse than 
he/she actually may be), it is necessary for the psychologist to base 
his/her conclusions on the strongest objective evidence that can be gath-
ered. To facilitate the diagnostic process, some investigators have 
standardized neuropsychological test batteries. However, 1 ittle research 
has been done concerning the benefits these instruments provide in the 
detection of malingering. 
The purpose of the present study is to broaden this research area 
and explore the possibility of differentiating malingerers from closed 
head injury patients with the Luria-Nebraska Neuropsychological Test Bat-
tery (LNNB; Golden, Hammeke, & Purisch, 1978). 
Golden et al. (1978), in developing the Luria-Nebraska Neuropsycho-
logical Battery, have attempted to follow Luria 1s (1973, 1980) philoso-
phy of examining each functional/dysfunctional system closely. Items in 
a given area of the battery are administered, each item having a very 
subtle variation to tap the additional skills of the patient. The pat-
tern of deficits of the patient allows for the interpretation of the na-
ture of the patient•s difficulty. 
The battery is composed of 269 items and can be administered in two 
to three hours. The items are divided into 11 sections which include: 
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mot~r skills, rhythmic and pitch skills, tactile skills, expressive lan-
guage skills, receptive language skills, reading, writing, arithmetic, 
memory, visual-spatial skills, and intellectual processes. Based on the 
scores from each section.of the battery, a patient profile can be deriv-
ed, and the pattern of strengths and weaknesses can be examined. If the 
profiles are characteristic of specific brain-injured groups (e.g., later-
alized or diffuse damage, alcoholics, epileptics), then malingerers might 
also produce a distinctive profile. 
The validity and reliability studies (Golden et al ., 1978; Golden, 
Moses, Fishburne, Engum, Lewis, Wisniewski, Conley, Berg, & Graber, 1981; 
Golden, Moses, Graber, & Berg, 1981; Lewis, Golden, Moses, Osmon; ,Purisch, 
& Hammeke, 1979; Purisch et al., 1978) conducted by the Golden research 
group to date provide support not only for Luria 1 s theory (Osmon, 1980) 
but for the standardized battery itself. The research also supports the 
concept of profiles characteristic of particular kinds of damage (e.g., 
Purisch et al ., 1978; Chmiel ski & Golden, 1980; Golden, 1979; De Obaldia, 
Leber, & Parsons, 1981; Osmon, Golden, Purisch, Hammeke, & Blume, 1979). 
However, many of those outside the Golden research group would take issue 
with the battery 1 s success (Crosson & Warren, 1982; Del is & Kaplan, 1982; 
Spiers, 1982, 1981). 
Studies have yet to emphasize performance of closed head injury pa-
tients on the LNNB; however, it is likely that a diffuse pattern of in-
volvement including, in particular, deficits in the areas of memory, in-
tellectual processes, and language, would be indicated with the amount 
of impairment varying with the severity of the injury. The present study 
will attempt to provide some further insights into the use of pattern 
analysis with the LNNB by comparing patterns of scores produced by head 
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trauma patients, normal individuals, and malingerers. If performance 
profiles of brain-damaged groups are as representative as the Golden re-
search team contends, then malingerers may also produce .a characteristic 
profile. Provided the patterns are distinctive, it should be possible 
to differentiate not only between normals and brain-damaged patients, 
but also between malingerers and.brain-damaged patients. 
CHAPTER I I 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Although much research has been undertaken, there is a lack of com-
parability, in general, across the area of neuropsychology. Consequent-
ly, it is difficult to observe trends among studies and draw conclusions. 
Few experimenters have utilized the same assessment tools; in fact, the 
number of different tests used in neuropsychological research is frequent-
ly equal to the number of different studies under consideration. While 
tests for specific deficits, such as aphasia, memory, and visuospatial 
problems, are abundant, there are few formalized neuropsychological test 
batt~ries (Lezak, 1983) because many neuropsychologists still prefer to 
assemble their own test batteries to meet the unique needs of each of 
their patients (Lezak, 1983; Luria, 1980; Smith, 1975). 
Testing for specific weaknesses may be an effective method for the 
experienced clinician; however, it does not provide much guidance in fur-
ther clarifying brain/behavior relationships. Thus, most research with 
non-standardized, uniquely suited assessment devices may serve only to 
increase the confusion in the area. Additionally, when called upon to 
testify, recommend, or diagnose residual deficits from possible brain 
damage, the clinician, without a standardized battery, must rely on his/ 
her intuition. The clinician may be accurate, but intuition typically 
does not provide much support for an insurance claim or legal action. 
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Ironically, the most recent development of a standardized neuropsy-
chological test battery was based on the work and philosophy of a Rus-
sian neuropsychologist who felt clinical judgment and intuition were the 
best ways to evaluate and test a brain-injured patient. 
Indeed, the qualitative evaluation of localizing and identifying 
brain dysfunction within each patient served asthefoundation of Luria's 
(1973, 1980) neuropsychological technique. He developed sets of proce-
dures often based on intuition for the assessment of each individual. 
But it was not this intuition that made Luria's work so valuable; it was 
his ability to "explain complex brain processes in terms of a simple and 
comprehensive model that could account for the mass of seemingly unrelat-
ed data that have been collected in neuropsychology11 (Golden, Hammeke, 
Purisch, Berg, Moses, Newlin, Wilkening, & Puente, 1982, p. 1). 
Luria's (1973, 1980) theory of brain function is based on his no-
tion of ''functional 'systems. 11 He conceptualized the brain as a mass of 
specific areas working together within a particular functional system, 
each complimenting one another's function in the production of human be-
havior. Each brain area in the functional system was necessary but not 
sufficient to produce the behavior. Thus, when one brain area in a sys-
tem was affected, the entire system also would be affected. The only loss 
which co~ld be observed would be that of the entire functional system; the 
damage was evident, but exactly what brain area was damaged was not. 
Luria's neuropsychological investigation was predicated on the iden-
tification of the damaged area through 11syndrome analysis 1 ' (Luria, 1973, 
1980). Luria wrote (cited by Christensen, 1975, p. 17) 11each of the 
(brain) areas makes a highly specific contribution to ensure the opera-
tion of the functional system.'' If a specific area is damaged, it would 
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be expected that every functional system cooperating with that area would 
be affected as well. Luria (Christensen, 1975, p. ,17) saw the aim of 
neuropsychology, in the diagnosis of focal lesions, as the analysis of 
"the disturbances of the higher cortical processes orthe specifl'c traits 
of a person's psychic activity. 11 
Luria (1980) emphasized that to identify the specific deficits of 
the patient, it was not necessarily the patient's ability to perform the 
task which was important, but the way in which he went about solving it. 
In this regard, he administered items in a number of different ways in 
order to flesh out the exact nature of the deficit. This "syndrome anal-
ysis'' would identify a unique pattern of deficits and enable interpreta-
tion of the exact nature of the patient's difficulty. 
Luria was able to thoroughly explore his patients' problem areas, 
but his methods gained little recognition in the United States. He 
stressed the importance of flexibility in testing a patient and would 
tailor the tests in his neuropsychological investigation to the indivi-
dual demands of each patient's difficulty. Although this technique was 
effective for Luria, it has made it difficult for others to use the test 
and derive any meaning from the results. There was 1 ittle information 
as to how to interpret any results because Luria used no quantification 
of his measures and, finally, there had been little investigation into 
the reliability and validity of Luria's procedures. As Reitan (1976) 
pointed out, there has been no evidence, except Luria's word, that his 
methods have any validity at al 1. 
Based on Luria's (1973, 1980) theory of brain function and his test 
administration techniques, the Luria-Nebraska Neuropsychological Battery 
(LNNB) was designed as a standardized and comprehensive tool for assessing 
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brain injury which would overcome the limitations of Luria's procedure 
but would not lose its qualitative aspects (Golden, Hammeke, & Purisch, 
1978). The LNNB, being a theoretically supported test, has the poten-
tial for great utility. Osmon (1980) has emphasized that with each of 
the basic parts of a complex function identified, the differing qual i-
ties of the function can be evaluated individually leading to the speci-
fication of the dysfunctional part of the system in accordance with the 
way in which the brain theoretically performs the behavior. 
Standardization of Luria's neuropsychological investigation began 
shortly after the work of Christensen (1975) became available. She pub-
1 ished materials useful for the administration of the test battery which 
she obtained partially through her work with Luria and partially through 
her own experience. Christensen had a specific terminology with general 
instructions and cards which provided the actual foundation for the LNNB. 
Using Christensen's work as a guide and keeping with the,spirit of 
Luria's concept of syndrome analysis, Golden et al. (1978) developed 
items for the standardized battery. The initial study (Golden et al ., 
1978) was an attempt to establish validity and scoring reliability for 
the original 285 LNNB items. Fifty medical controls and fifty neurologi-
cal patients were administered the test battery. Nearly 90 percent of 
the items differentiated between brain injured and normal patients and, 
in all cases, the neurological .patients performed more poorly than nor-
mal patients. 
Golden and his colleagues tri~d several different systems of scor-
ing the items and emphasized the need for a summary scoring system which 
was developed later (Purisch, Golden, & Hammeke, 1978). The final method 
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of scoring is similar to that of Luria's ratings (Golden et al., 1980). 
Most of the items are scored as either 0, 1, or 2; 11011 represents normal 
performance (no dysfunction), 11 111 is characteristic of a mid-range per-
formance seen in both normals and bra:i:n-injured individuals (a weak de-
gree of dysfunction), and 11211 is suggestive of the performance of a brain-
injured person (a strong amount of dysfunction). Scoring criteria in-
elude accuracy, frequency and adequacy of response, number of errors, 
time for performance, trials until correct performance, and number of 
items completed (Purisch et al ., 1978). The scoring method varies based 
on the nature of the item .and the quality being assessed. 
This initial project also served as a check on the reliability of 
the scoring system (Golden et al ., 1978}. Pairs of independent examin-
ers rated the performance of five patients on all items and achieved in-
terrater agreement ranging from 92 to 98 percent. However, as the au-
thors later pointed out, the percentages were 1 ikely to be inflated due 
to the dichotomous nature of almost one-third of the test items (scored 
as either 11011 or 11211). In patients with chronic, unchanging organic con-
I 
ditions, Golden, Berg, and Graber (1982} found test-retest reliability 
over the 14 LNNB scales to range from 0.77 to 0.96 with an average of 
0.88 and a test-retest interval average of 167 days. However, the re1i-
ability of measuring specific types of functions within scales has not 
been included in any studies to date (Crosson & Warren, 1982}. 
In addition to the 11 basic scales, 3 more scales were developed 
based on the already existing items (Purisch et al., 1978). The 32 items 
considered as the most effective indicators of brain damage when scored 
as ''2 11 became the Pathognomonic Scale (Purisch et al., 1978). The other 
two scales are the sum of all items which require right- or left-handed 
motor or tactile function and were label·ed Right and Left Hemisphere 
Scales, respectively (Purisch et al ., 1978). 
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Following the initial development of the standardized battery, Golden 
and his associates sought to demonstrate the ability of the battery to 
differentiate psychiatric patients from those with brain damage, to de-
velop scales to measure laterality and localization of injury, and final-
ly, to examine the effects of age, education, medication, chronicity, 
intelligence, and severity of injury on performance (Golden eta!., 1978). 
Purisch et al. (1978) found that the 14 summary measures when used 
as a pattern of performance could distinguish brain damaged from schizo-
phrenic patients with 88 percent diagnostic accuracy. More recently, 
the LNNB has been shown to successfully differentiate among schizophren-
ics with and without brain damage (Puente, Heidelberg-Sanders, & Lund, 
1982) and with and without ventricular enlargement (Golden, Macinnes, 
Ariel, Ruedrich, Chu, Coffman, Graber, & Bloch, 1982). 
In the pursuit of developing validity for the capacity of the test 
battery to localize affected brain area(s), the results of the first 
study of localization suggested that each area of each hemisphere can be 
distinguished by specific patterns of scores (Lewis, Golden, ~1oses, Osmon, 
Purisch, & Hammeke, 1979). Twenty-four right-hemisphere and 36 left-
hemisphere patients were divided into eight groups (left frontal, left 
sensory-motor, left parietal-occipital, left temporal, right frontal, 
right sensory-motor, right parietal-occipital, or right temporal) depend-
ing on hemisphere involved and location within that hemisphere as deter-
mined by neurological evidence, i.e., CAT scan, surgical results, and/or 
angiogram. It was found that the 14 summary scores when used togethe·r 
produced profiles which supported clinical patterns and heretofore had 
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been identified only theoretically. For example, rig~t frontal patients 
performed in such a way as to produce deficits theoretically considered 
to be characteristic of right frontal patients. Overall comparisons 
among the eight groups and a normal control group resulted in 88 of 112 
possible comparisons being significant. A far smaller number of signifi-
cant differences were produced when a 11 poss i b 1 e comparisons of thee i gh t 
groups were examined without the inclusion of the normal control 9roup 
in the analysis. Of the 392 comparisons, 79 were significant. The au-
thors attribute this result to the small sample size of each group. 
Lewis et al. (1979, p. 1010) suggest that the profiles appear to show 
11configural discriminations between these groups. 11 
Attemptsto developspecific scales to diagnose lateralization of in-
jury have also been made. McKay and Golden (1979a, 1979b) created left 
hemisphere (L*), right hemisphere (R*), and eight localization scales. 
They found the empirically derived hemisphere scales could lateral ize 
the lesion accurately (by choosing the higher of the two scales) 87 per-
cent of the time and the eight localization scales could correctly class-
ify specific areas (again by choosing the highest of the scales) 88 per-
cent of the time (McKay & Golden, 1979b). 
The authors were quick to poiM: out problems with the scales (the 
scales were based on small samples and numerous t tests were performed) 
and that cross-validation was necessary to lend support to their find-
ings (McKay & Golden, 1979a, 1979b). Since then a cross-validation was 
undertaken which suggests that the eight localization scales tend to be 
better for lateral izing injury than the actual hemisphere scales (Golden 
et al., 1981). The localization scales accurately lateralized the inJury 
for 32 of the 87 subjects while the empirically derived lateralization 
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scales correctly classified only 68 of the 87. Additionally, lesioned 
areas were correctly localized in 65 of the 87 cases and the affected 
quadrant was correctly identified in 73 of the 87. Extensive work on 
individual item interpretation has recently been completed ('Golden et al ·., 
1982). McKay and Golden (1981) have also derived numerous additional 
scales based on factor analysis of the items. 
In normal individuals, scores of the LNNB will vary significantly 
with both age and education (Golden eta., 1980). To control for the 
performance differences which could be produced merely by differences in 
age and education, Golden et al. (1980) developed a regression equation 
which created a corrected baseline of performance for each individual. 
Golden et al. (1980), in examiming the performance of 60 brain dam-
aged patients with differing educational levels, found a score cutoff of 
more than 10 points above baseline accurately identified 86.6 percent of 
the brain damaged patients and 90 percent of the control subjects. This 
cutoff of 10 points above baseline has been termed the critical level 
which is generally used in c1 inical practice, and any LNNB score above 
it is considered abnormal. If two or more scales, with the exception of 
Arithmetic, Writing, Left Hemisphere, and Right Hemisphere, are above 
the critical level, it is likely the patient is brain damaged (Golden 
et al., 1980). In a sample of 120 subjects with confirmed brain injuries 
(diagnosis by medical tests, EEG, CAT scan or angiogram), 109 were cor-
rectly identified using the above mentioned criterion. 
The LNNB is, of course, not without its critics (I.Jezak, 1983; Crosson, 
& ~Jarren, 1982; Del is & Kaplan, 1983, 1982; Spiers, 1982, 1981). Even 
Christensen (1975, p. 26) noted that 11static standardized techniques are 
entirely discouraged.•• Crosson and Warren (1982), in a critique of the 
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use of the LNNB for the assessment of aphasia, cited the limited utility 
and validity for examining functional deficits, because the LNNB was de-
signed withowt consideration for the construct validity of the scales. 
Scaled scores have 1 ittle meaning for quantifying specific deficits be-
cause of the degree of heterogeneity within each scale (Delis & Kaplan, 
1983). Crosson and Warren (1982) also pointed out that even the nonlan-
guage scales contain a strong verbal component. However, this could be 
characterized as consistent with Luria 1 s intense interest in language 
and its role in bhe regulation of behavior (Shelly & Goldstein, 1982). 
More recently, investigators outside the Golden research group have 
found neither the 14 summary scales nor the localization and lateral iza-
tion scales to be particularly effective for determining laterality of 
brain damage. Sears, Hirt, and Hall (1984) tested 40 male VA patients 
who were assigned to one of fourgroups based on neurological evidence 
(i.e., computerized tomography scan, blood-flow studies, brain scan, and 
neurosurgery reports). Brain-damaged patients were classified as having 
unilateral left or right hemisphere lesions or bilateral diffuse brain 
damage. The fourth group was a medical control group without neurologi-
cal involvement. They found that, for most scales, differences in mean 
group performances were between brain-damaged and non-brain~damaged sub-
jects. The researchers concluded that their results supported the con-
clusion of Dells and Kaplan (1983) that the LNNB is limited in the iden-
tification of specific deficits because of the methods used in construc-
tion of the battery. 
Golden has gone to great lengths to defend the heterogeneity of the 
scales by emphasizing individual itme interpretation (Golden et al ., 
1982). The LNNB could be considered a series of 269 independent tasks, 
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each with its own meaning (Golden, Ariel, Moses, \/ilkening, McKay, & 
~1aclnnes, 1982) which is seen as in concert with Luria 1 s concept of func-
tional systems. Neither the scales nor the items should be seen as "11J}ure 11 
(measuring only a single skill or ability) because of Luria•s emphasis on 
the analysis of how a patient performs an item or pattern of items; it is 
the qualitative nature of the performance which is important (Golden et 
al ., 1982). For example, a brain-injured individual may miss a particu-
lar item on the Expressive Speech Scale not because he/she cannot verbal-
ize the sound but perhaps because he/she cannot remember the sound long 
enough to reproduce it. This qualitative difference must not be over-
looked when interpreting the patient•s performance. 
Spiers (1982, 1981) has been especially critical of the Golden re-
search team on a number of issues. In particular, he has criticized the 
lack of control of subject characteristics, age, and onset of disorder. 
Spiers also noted that level of education was dealt with after the fact 
by analysis of variance and covariance, and there was a general disre-
gard of subject handedness, and drug, alcohol, developmental, or psychi-
atric histories. This controversy is far from over and the criticism 
seems legitimate; however, the LNNB has been shown (Golden, Kane, Sweet, 
Moses, Cardell ino, Templeton, Vicente, & Graber, 1981; Kane, Sweet, 
Golden, Parsons, & Moses, 1981) to be at least as effective in diagnos-
ing brain damage as the more widely used Halstead-Reitan Test Battery 
(Halstead, 1947; Reitan, 1955). 
Golden et al. (1981) and Kane et al. (1981) have compared the 
Halstead-Reitan to the LNNB. In a subject pool of 108 patients (30 
schizophrenics, 48 brain-damaged, and 30 normal controls) tested in 
California, Oklahoma, and Nebraska, Golden et al. (1981) compared the 
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major 14 measures of the Halstead-Reitan with the 14 summary scores of 
the LNNB. The researchers, using a discriminant analysis, found both 
batteries to be equally effective in identifying brain damage (hit ratio 
over 85%). There was also a significant relationship between the LNNB 
scale scores and the Halstead-Reitan measures. 
In comparing the diagnostic accuracies of the LNNB and the Halstead-
Reitan battery in a mixed psychiatric and brain-damaged sample, Kane et 
al. (1981) had experienced raters classify the subjects in two separate 
comparisons. In the first comparison of 45 subjects, the Halstead-Reitan 
rater correctly identified 35 subjects while the LNNB rater accurately 
classified 37 of the 45. The second comparison using 36 subjects found 
the Halstead-Reitan rater to be correct 29 out of 36 times and the LNNB 
rater to be accurate in 28 instances. 
Research examining the relationship between LNNB patterns and speci-
fic neurological disorders has just begun in the last several years (e.g., 
Chmielski & Golden, 1980; Golden, 1979; De Obaldia, Leber, & Parsons, 
1981). To date, no work has been done specifically in the area of assess-
Ing the residual deficits of closed head injury with the LNNB, but inves-
tigators have compared the performance of those individuals suffering 
from right or left hemisphere damage with performances of those sustain-
ing diffuse or bilateral damage (Osmon, Golden, Purisch, Hammeke, & 
Blume, 1979). Patients with injuries to either the right or left hemi-
sphere or with diffuse damage were assigned to their respective groups 
based on definitive neurological evidence (i.e., CAT scan, surgery, EEG, 
angiogram, pneumoencephalogram). Using discriminant analysis of the 14 
summary scale scores, 59 of the 60 patients were correctly identified. 
Overall, J~ft hemisphere lesioned patients performed worst while those 
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with right hemisphere lesions performed best. The patients with diffuse 
damage, including those with head trauma, performed in between the two 
extremes. 
It is apparent, at least from the research com~leted so far, that 
the LNNB is a valid and reliable instrument for detecting the presence 
of brain injury (Golden eta.L,-1978, 1981, 1982; Puente et al., 1982; 
Purisch et al., 1978). It has also been found useful for the specific 
localization and lateralization of lesions and in separating focal from 
diffuse injuries (Golden et al., 1981; Lewis et al., 1979; McKay&Golden, 
1979a, 1979b). Some research with the LNNB suggests its utility with 
neurological diseases, such as alcoholism, epilepsy, and multiple sclero-
sis (e.g., Chmielskl & Golden, 1980; Golden, 1979; De Obaldia et al., 
1981). However, it is likely that no published research to date has 
singled out closed head injury patients for study because head trauma 
rarely produces focal lesions and would likely not be of interest in 
studies attempting to localize injury. 
In an attempt to broaden research in the area, the present investi-
gation will examine the performance of closed head injury patients on 
the LNNB. Due to the diffuse involvement of neural tissue, the patterns 
of performance would probably show a wide range of deficits. Although 
the profile of a closed head injury patient may not be as striking as, 
for example, that of a patient with a focal lesion to the left hemisphere, 
closed head trauma introduces an interesting variable. Because it is 
typically caused by an accident (Annegers et al ., 1980; Kalsbeek et al ., 
1980), there is.the possibility of malingering. 
People who are seeking compensation for their injuries from insur-
ance companies or through J itigation may attempt to look more severely 
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disturbed than they actually are to insure monetary gain. This is far 
from a recent development; as early as 1888, deficits resulting from 
railway injuries were questioned based on the significance of the desire 
for compensation (Strauss & Savitsky, 1934). A question which arises at 
this point and, indeed, the focus of the present study is, could the LNNB 
differentiat·ebetweenbrain-damaged individuals and malingerers? 
Personality research has often emphasized the susceptibility of its 
measures to fak1ng and, therefore, provides some guidance for examining 
the possibility of malingering on a neuropsychological test.~ Holden and 
Jackson (1981) investigated the relative usefulness of subtle versus ob-
vious scales with persons who have been instructed to 11fake good 11 or 
11 fake bad 11 on the Personality Research Form (PRF), Form£, and have been 
informed as to the exact nature of the test. They found faking effects 
for all scales and that with the 11correct 11 response set, it could be pos-
sible to distort self-presentation. The investigators found they were 
able to detect faking using the Desirabi1 ity scale of the PRF. It was 
also apparent that scale subtlety was not a determining factor of the 
subject•s ability to fake; it was not immune to distortion. 
In another study of test susceptibility to faking, Redmore (1976) 
found that on a sentence completion test of ego development. subjects 
were able to decrease their ego level test scores but were not able to 
successfully increase them. She noted that only with intensive study of 
ego development could a person actually raise test scores. 
By far, most of the research performed in the area of response sets 
(faking) has been with the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory 
(MMPI; Dahlstrom, \.Jelsh, & Dahlstrom, 1975). In fact, the t1~1PI was de-
signed as a structured personality test which would detect faked responses 
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because, as Meeh I and Hathaway ( 1980) pointed out, suscept i b i I i ty to 11fak-
ing11 or 11 lying 11 is one of the greatest problems with the structured test. 
Through their work with the MMPI, Meehl and Hathaway (1980) develop-
ed the L, F, and K scales which, theoretically, should correct for and 
allow detection of faking. This development provided many research op-
portunit!es. If the scales could aid in the detection of faking, then 
accuracy in the diagnosis of the presence/absence of a psychiatric dis-
order could increase. 
Although a large portion of the MMPI response set 1 iterature has 
been devoted to 11 faking good 11 or socially desirable responding (e.g., 
Wales & Seeman, 1972, 1968; Wiggins, 1966; Walker, 1962), it is there-
search concerning malingering or 11 faking bad" which is more pertinent to 
the present study. 
Differing outcomes have been reported by investigators studying the 
detection of malingering. Gough (1946) has suggested that malingered 
profiles may be detected by identifying odd patterns ofT-scores, but 
Hunt, Carp, Cass, Winder, and Kantor (1948) found this to be of 1 ittle 
use in diagnosis. Meehl and Hathaway (1980) reported that psychology 
students instructed to 11 fake bad 11 will obtain F scores greater than 15 
(most normals score between 2 and 4). Gough (1946) found that subjects 
skilled in P?YChology and psychiatry (3 psychiatrists, 3 clinical psycho-
logists, 3 psychiatric social workers, 2 personnel consultants) could 
not successfully simulate either a neurotic or psychotic profile and that 
the F and K scales allowed for this detection. Hunt (1948) found the F 
score to increase in court-martialed prisoners instructed to 11 fake bad 11 
and the K score to decrease when instructed to 11fake good. 11 F scores 
were found to be helpful in identifying negative malingering and a 
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combined Land K score was found to be useful for revealing positive ma-
lingering by Cofer, Chance, and Judson (1949). Anthony (1971) found his 
subjects (40 United States Air Force male clients) to be more sophisti-
cated in their malingering. The mean exaggerated profile was lower in 
elevation and had less of a positive skew than t~e saw-toothed pattern 
produced by normal, psychologically skilled subjects attempting to mal in-
ger. Branca and Podolnick (1961) found that subjects who took the MMPI 
under hypnotic suggestion of anxiety produced valid profiles, whereas 
those same subjects told to fake anxiety could not produce valid pro-
files. 
Though the results gathered suggest different uses of the validity 
scales in identifying faked profiles, it seems clear that malingering 
can be detected by the MMPI regardless of how psychologically sophisti-
cated the malingerer may be. If this is the case with personality mea-
surement, then how 1 ikely would it be for a person to be identified as 
faking a brain injury? Very 1 ittle work has been done in this area for 
a number of reasons, but it is 1 ikely due to the individualization of 
most neuropsychological assessment techniques. The experienced clinician 
can strongly attest to his/her ability to detect malingering, but without 
standardized tests and their accompanying normative data with which to 
compare patients• results, how strongly can those judgments be supported? 
For this reason, the present investigation has selected the LNNB for 
study. It is a standardized tool with a great deal of data supporting 
its reliability and validity for discriminating brain-damaged from non-
brain-damaged individuals, but no work has examined its ability to detect 
faking. In fact, there has been almost no research conducted with regard 
to faking on neuropsychological test data. 
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In introducing their own study, Heaton, Smith, Lehman, and Vogt 
(1978, p. 893) wrote, ''no research has shown whether malingerers' neuro-
psychological test scores can be distinguished from those of nonmal inger-
ing brain ~damaged patients." Heaton et al. (1978) compared: the perfor-
mances of volunteer malingerers with non-1 itigating head-injured patients 
on the MMPI, the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale(WAIS;Hechsler, 1955), 
and the Halstead-Reitan battery (Halstead, 1947; Reitan, 1955). The volun-
teer malingerers were instructed to pretend they had suffered head in-
juries in accidents caused by other individuals. They were also told to 
consider themselves involved in legal action which would determine their 
financial compensation and to appear as severely disabled as possible 
without obviously faking. Technicians 11b1ind" to the experiment adminis-
tered the test batteries and 10 neuropsychologists provided independent 
11bl ind'' ratings as to whether they thought the protocol was malingered. 
The authors pointed out that making a determination of faking based on 
one or two poor test scores would be very difHcult for a clinician, but 
a consideration of the pattern of strengths and deficits shown 
on more comprehensive testing may make such discrimination pos-
sible; that is, to fool the clinician on the test battery, the 
malingerer must show a pattern of results that is similar to 
patterns of scores earned by head injury patients with real de-
ficits (Heaton et al ., 1978, p. 894). 
They found overall impairment of the two groups to be equalt butpat-
terns of strengths and weaknesses were different. The malingerers did 
especially poorly on motor and sensory tests but did relatively well on 
several of the cognitive tests most sensitive to brain dysfunction. Addi-
tiona11y, the malingerers' profiles on the MMPI showed severe disturbance. 
The 1 ikelihood of expert raters to correctly classify malingerers and 
nonmal ingerers based only on test results as opposed to additional useful 
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information (i.e., 11detJails of patients• injuries, findings of neurologi-
cal clinical and laboratory tests, how the recovery periods had gone, 
how well the patients had done in life prior to their injuries, behavior-
al observations made by the neuropsychological technicians and even some 
test data,•• Heaton et al., 1978, p. 899) ranged from chance-level to 
about 20 percent above chance. Discriminant function analysis correctly 
classified 100 percent of the subjects based on the neuropsychological 
test results and 94 percent based on the MMPI results. 
The investigators then used the discriminant functions withalarger 
sample (84) of head injury patients not included in the formula develop-
ment but who had been clinically evaluated. Half of those patients were 
known to be involved in 1 itigation, either civil or criminal, and had 
reason to appear more seriously disturbed and/or gave clinical evidence 
of doing so. The other half of the patients were not involved in any 
court action and were considered to have put forth a reasonable amount 
of effort during testing. Of the 42 patients involved in legal action, 
27 were classified as malingerers using one or both formulas. Only 1·1 
of the 42 patients who had no reasons to exaggerate were identified as 
malingerers by one or both formulas. Those subjects obviously faking 
and patients involved in legal action were significantly more 1 ikely to 
be classified as malingerers by the formulas. 
They concluded that based on the statistical analysis, group differ-
ences in patterns of neuropsychological test data and MMPI scores are 
sufficiently reliable to allow for prediction of group membership (Heaton 
et al., 1978). The authors emphasized the intrinsic susceptibility of 
neuropsychological tests to faking along with the need for further re-
search into patterns of performance characteristic of malingerers. The 
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authors suggested this goal would more 1 ikely be achieved through the- use 
of standardized and comprehensive neuropsychological testing rather than 
through nonstandardized, briefer clinical examinations. That the clini-
cians were not very successful in separating malingerers from nonmal in-
gerers lends support to the utility of the standardized test battery. A 
standardized instrument can be statistically analyzed and characteristic 
patterns of performance can be identified. H~d more work been completed 
in this area, perhaps, the clinicians would have been more accurate in 
their predictions. 
Statement of the Problem 
The diagnosis of residual deficits from closed head injury has taken 
on more practical importance in recent years due to the increased chance 
for survival from head trauma. In addition to the neurological and/or 
neurosurgical procedures necessary for diagnosis, there is often a need 
for neuropsychological testing in instances where it is not obvious how 
an individual's life will be affected by the injury. These instances 
could include patients who have required 1 ittle or no hospitalization 
and who have recovered sufficiently to resume normal activities but who 
have not recovered to a level of premorbid functioning. With testing, 
deficits can be identified and evaluated as to the type of impact they 
could have on the patient's future. 
While the patient and his/her family are obviously interested in the 
final recovery, there are often other parties involved. Frequently, 
there is legal action necessary because of the high probability that the 
injury was due to an accident (Annegers et al ., 1980; Kalsbeek et al ., 
1980). There is also a more I ikely possibility of involvement of an 
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insurance company because the patient will probably desi·re compensation 
for his/her injury and will file a claim. A valid question then arises 
when a neuropsychologist is asked to evaluate the patient's deficits. Is 
the assessment an accurate evaluation or is the patient attempting to ap-
pear more severely disabled in order to gain as much compensation as pos-
sible? If the patient is 11faking bad 11 or malingering, how likely is it 
that the neuropsychologist would be aware of it? 
Detection of malingering on psychological tests, such as the Minne-
sota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI), has been shown to be pos-
sible by examining the validity profile (e.g., Branca & Podolnick, 1961; 
Cofer et al ., 1949; Hunt, 1948; Meehl & Hathaway, 1980) and the pattern 
of scores from the cl inlca1 scales produced by the malingerer (e.g., 
Anthony, 1971; Gough, 1947, 1946). However, little research has been 
undertaken with respect to faking neuropsychological test data. 
Heaton et al. (1978), in the only published research to date, ex-
plored the 1 ikelihood of detecting believable deficits on the Halstead-
Reitan Test Battery, the Wechsler Adult lntell igence Scale, and the MMPI. 
Using "blind11 ratings, 10 neuropsychologists were able to correctly iden-
tify malingerers from nonmal ingerers 50 to 70 percent of the time. How-
ever, the discriminant function analysis correctly classified 100 percent 
of the patients in both groups based on the neuropsychological test re-
sults and 94 percent based on the MMPI results. With a larger sample, 
64.3 percent of the patients in both groups were correctly identified us-
ing the discriminant functions derived in the initial stages of the,inves-
t igation. 
These tests were chosen for the Heaton et al. (1978) study because 
of their psychometric properties; they have normative data and have been 
25 
shown to be valid and ret iable. The Luria-Nebraska Neuropsychological 
Test Battery (Golden, Purisch, & Hammeke, 1978) has similar qualities. 
In direct comparison with the Halstead-Reitan Battery, it has been found 
to be equally effective in differentiating brain damaged from normals 
and brain damaged from psychiatric patients (Golden et at., 1981; Kane 
et al., 1981; Shelly & Goldstein, 1982). The LNNB has also been shown 
to have validity and reliability for detecting the presence of brain dam-
age (Golden et al., 1978, 1981, 1982; Puente et al., 1982; Purisch etaJ., 
1978). Initial research supports its ability to discriminate between 
lateral ized and diffuse injury (Osmon et at., 1979), and the work com-
pleted in the development of scales for localization and lateral ization 
of damage seems promising (Golden et al., 1981; Lewis etal., 1979; McKay 
& Golden, 1979a, 1979b). As the LNNB is a relatively new test battery, 
many have been critical of its development and subsequent use (Crosson & 
Warren, 1982; Delis & Kaplan, 1983, 1982; Spiers, 1982, 1981). A recent 
independent cross-validation of the LNNB found the battery to be effec-
tive in discriminating brain-damaged from normal control subjects, but 
it was relatively ineffective in determining laterality of brain damage 
(Sears, Hi rt, & Ha 11 , 1984) . 
As few attempts have been made to examine the probability of detect-
ing faked deficits on neuropsychological t'ests, the present study examin-
ed the likelihood of detecting a malingered head injury profile on the 
LNNB. Specifically, the present study compared the profiles of subjects 
attempting to fake closed head injury with two samples of closed head in-
jury patients, one younger and one ·older. The head injury sample was 
initially divided into two age groups for a number of reasons: a typical 
head trauma victim tends to be 15 to 30 years of age and the younger 
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patients would be more comparable in age and education to the available 
university undergraduate population. Also, an older head trauma victim 
may react differently to injury (i.e., he/she may be more traumatized by 
it) and may be chronic. Additionally, differences between groups may be 
produced because of age, not presence or absence of brain injury; there-
fore, the split into older and younger groups should allow for detection 
of real differences rather than artifacts. Finally, the malingering sub-
jects may exaggerate deficits such that they would appear more similar 
to the older head-injured subjects than the younger head-injured sub-
jects. The performance of the malingerers was compared to that of the 
closed head injury patient group and to the normal, nonmalingering group. 
Profiles of normal nonmalingering subjects were compared to profiles of 
both groups of head injury patients and to the malingered profiles. Fin-
ally, the two closed head injury patient samples (younger and older) were 
compared to one another. 
CHAPTER I I I 
METHODOLOGY 
Subjects 
All patient data were provided by Charles Golden of the Nebraska 
Psychiatric Institute from a large, diverse population (over 1200) of 
brain-damaged, psychiatric, and normal, non-brain-damaged individuals. 
These patients were from various areas of the United States and had been 
administered the luria-Nebraska Neuropsychological Test Battery (LNNB). 
This group included individuals suffering from cerebral vascular acci-
dents, metabolic and toxic diseases, neoplasms, closed and open head in-
juries, and various psychiatric disorders. Only patients who had sus-
tained closed head injuries without laceration (a total of 32) were used 
in the present investigation. The college-age head-injury sample (17 to 
26 years of age) was composed of 10 males and 3 females, with a mean age 
of 21.77 years (~ = 3.05) and a mean of 11.85 years (SD = 1.34 of educa-
tion. The older head-injury sample (27 to 65 years of age) was composed 
of 15 males and 4 females, with a mean age of 41.37 years (~ = 11.26) 
and a mean of 11.89 years (SD = 3.41) of education. 
The non-brain-damaged subjects were 24 males and 6 female students 
enrolled in an undergraduate psychology course at a large southwestern 
university. Subjects received extra credit points for participating in 
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the experiment. At the time of recruiting, the subjects were told of 
the general nature of the study and were assured of confidentiality. 
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Subjects were randomly assigned to one of two conditions, normal or 
faking, to achieve a ratio of males to females comparable to the closed 
head injury patient sample (approximately 4 to 1, males to females). The 
normal (control) group consisted of 11 males and 4 females, with a mean 
age of 19 years (SO= 1. 36) and a mean of 12.33 years (SO= 0. 52) of educa-
tion. The faking (experimental) group was composed of 13 males and 2 
females with a mean age of 20.13 years (SO= 2.26) and a mean of 12.87 
years (SO= 1.06) of education. 
Materials and Procedure 
The Luria-Nebraska Neuropsychological Test Battery (LNNB) was admin-
istered toeach non-brain-damaged subject individually by the experimenter. 
The LNNB contains 269 items scored as either 0, 1, or 2 and required ap-
proximately two to two-and-one-half hours to complete. The items are di-
vided into 11 basic scales and 3 clinical scales which include the fol-
lowing: motor, rhythm, tactile, visual, receptive and expressive speech, 
writing, reading, arithmetic, memotty functions, intellectua-l processes, 
right hemisphere, left hemisphere, and pathognomonic scales. 
A research assistant helped with the instructional period of the ex-
periment so that the experimenter did not know beforehand which subjects 
were taking the test normally and which were malingering. Before enter-
ing the experimental room, subjects were required to read and sign an in-
formed consent form (Appendix B) and were screened forapossible history 
of brain i:njury using the following three questions: 
1. Have you ever been unconscious due to a blow to the head? 
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2. Have you ever undergone brain surgery? 
3. Have you ever had meningitis or encephalitis? 
If a particular subject answered 11yes'' to any of the three ques-
tions, he/she was excluded from the study but still received the extra 
credit points for keeping the appointment. The research assistant then 
instructed each individual to read the information sheet for the appro-
priate condition. 
Subjects assigned to the normal or control condition received the 
following information: 
You will be taking the Luria-Nebraska Neuropsychological 
Test Battery. It will require approximately two to two-and-
one-half hours to complete. The test, which measures disabil-
ities that result from brain injuries, will cover a variety of 
sensory, motor, and cognitive functions. Please respond to 
all items to the best of your ability. 
Subjects assigned to the malingering condition received the follow-
ing information: 
You will be taking the Luria-Nebraska Neuropsychological 
Test Battery. It will require approximately two to two-and-
one-half hours to complete. The test, which·measures disabil-
ities that result from brain injuries, will cover a variety of 
sensory, motor, and cognitive functions. Pretend you have suf-
fered head injuries in an accident caused by another person or 
persons. Assume you are involved in litigation to determine 
how much financial compensation you will obtain from the people 
responsible for the accident and/or from the insurance compan-
ies involved. Imagine that your everyday functioning in and 
outside of school has been much worse since your accident, that 
your potential earning power has been substantially reduced,and 
that you deserve all the money that the courts will allow you. 
The results of this test will help determine how large your 
settlement wiil be, so fake the most severe disability that you 
can without making it obvious·to the examiner that you are fak-
ing. 
The experimental room contained all testing materials for the LNNB 
and a testing table with two chairs on opposite sides. The research 
assistant took the subject to the testing room where the experimenter 
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conducted the testing session. The experimenter instructed the subject 
to be seated, insured his/her comfort, and then asked each subject to 
••attempt to perform exactly as your information sheet suggested ,•l Test 
administration then began. At the completion of the test battery, the 
experiment was explained to each subject. All subjects were requested 
not to discuss the experiment with anyone. 
CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
All statistical analyses were performed using the Statistical Analy-
sis System (SAS; SAS Institute, 1982); specifically, PROC GLM, PROC ANOVA, 
and PROC MEANS were used. Multivariate analyses of variance were based 
on the Hotelling-Lawley Trace statistic (SAS Institute, 1982). 
The mean profiles for the young and old brain-damaged groups were 
compared using a multivariate analysis of variance of the dependent vari-
ables (scale !-scores) and were not found to be significantly different, 
Hotelling T2 , F(24,7), R < 0.63. This result did not support the assump-
tion that the older and younger brain-damaged patients would perform dif-
ferently. Consequently, the two groups were combined and a single factor 
(group) multivariate analysis of variance of the dependent variables 
(scale T-scores) was performed comparing the larger brain-damaged group, 
with the normal and faking groups. Significant differences were found 
between the three groups, F(48,70) = 3.14, £ < 0.001. 
Using Tukey's studentized range (HSD) test, the differences between 
the performances of the brain-damaged, normal, and faking groups were 
further examined. Univariate analyses of variance were not performed 
prior to the post hoc comparisons1 because as Keselman and Murray (1974, 
p. 609) have pointed out, 11experimentwise power does not change when 




The results were mixed in comparing the faking group and the brain-
damaged group with 14 of the 24 scale t-score performances differeing 
-
(Table 1, Appendix A). As can be seen in Figures 1 and 2, the faking 
group and the brain-damaged group performed differently on the Receptive 
Speech, Expressive Speech, Writing, Arithmetic, Memory, Pathognomonic, 
and R* Sca.les and on all of the localization scales. With one exception, 
the faking group did not perform as poorly as the brain-damaged group. 
Inspection of the mean profile for the brain-damaged group showed nearly 
all scale ~-scores as well above a !-score of 60; this was not the case 
with the mean profile of the fakers. All scale ~-scores for the normal 
group were far below a ~-score of 60 and were significantly different 
from those of the brain-damaged group. In all instances, the normal 
group performed better (lower s-scores) than the brain-damaged group 
(Table II, Appendix A). 
The normal and faking groups performed differently on 11 of the 24 
scales (Table I II, Appendix A). In particular, differences in perfor-
mance of the two groups were seen on the Motor, Rhythm, Tactile, Memory, 
Left and Right Hemisphere, Left and Right Sensory-Motor, Left Temporal, 
L* and R* Scales. However, even in the cases where the normals and the 
fakers did not differ significantly, the fakers had poorer (higher) 
scores than the normals. Mean profiles for each group are presented in 
Figures 1 and 2. The L* and R* Scales are not included in the figures 
as they have not been cross-validated or properly standardized and are 
experimental at this time. Mean 't-score values for the L* and R* Scales 
are listed in Tables I, I I, and II I (Appendix A). 
An important consideration at this point concerns the possibility 
that the differences in performance were produced due to the age and/or 
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performance can be affected by age and education, the same baseline of 
performance cannot be used for every individual. Therefore, a critical 
level, or adjusted baseline, must be calculated for each subject using 
the following regression equation (Golden, Hammeke, & Purisch, 1980): 
Critical Level = 68.8 + {Age* 0.412) + (Education* 1.47) 
Critical levels of the three groups were then examined using a sin-
gle factor {group) analysis of variance and were found to differ signifi-
cantly, F(2,59) = 4.85, £ < 0.01. The mean critical levels for the brain-
damaged, faking, and no~mal groups were 58.78, 55.23, and 56.31, respec-
tively. This being the case,the scale t-scores were then reanalyzed as 
deviations from critical level. A single factor (group) multivariate 
analysis of variance of the dependent variables (deviations from criti-
cal level·) showed significant differences between the groups, F(48, 70) 
= 3.00, £ < 0.0001. Using Tukey 1 s studentized range (HSD) test, the 
analysis of the deviations from critical level revealed fewer signifi-· 
cant differences between the brain-damaged and faking groups than the 
analysis of the scale !-scores for the same groups. 
The analysis of the deviations from critical level showed the two 
groups to differ on only 10 of the 24 scales, suggesting that some of the 
differences produced by comparing the scale t-scores could have been re-
flecting age and education differences of the groups (Table IV, Appendix 
A). As shown in Figures 3 and 4, the faking and brain-damaged groups 
differed on the Receptive Speech, Expressive Speech, Reading, Memory, 
Pathognomonic, Left and Right Frontal, Left Parietal-Occipital, Left Tem-
poral, and R* Scales. 
The analysis of the deviations from critical level revealed that the 
normal and faking groups differed on 12 of the 24 scales (Table V, 
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Appendix A). Specifically, the two groups performed differently on the 
Motor, Rhythm, Tactile, Memory, Left and Right Hemisphere, Left Sensory-
Motor, Left and Right Temporal, Right Parietal-Occipital, L*, and R* 
Scales. Without exception, the normal group had significantly different 
and lower scores than the brain-damaged group (Table VI, Appendix A). 
Figures 3 and 4 show the mean profiles using the deviations from critical 
level measure for the three groups. Again, the L* and R* Scales are not 
included in the figures but the values for the three groups are available 
in Tables IV, V, and VI (Appendix A). 
Since the experimenter was 11 blind 11 to the type of instructions re-
ceived by each subject, there was an opportunity for subjective identi-
fication of subjects performing normally and those faking. Based only 
on the experience with the subject during the testing, the experimenter 
was able to correctly identify those faking from those taking the test 
normally in 23 of the 30 situations (77% accuracy). Four normal sub-
jects Were thought to be faking while three faking subjects were identi-







































u .. ~ 8 
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The incentive for individuals to 11fake bad 11 or malinger in order to 
gain greater monetary compensation for head injuries presents an inter-
esting dilemma for those people making diagnoses or determining whether 
to grant compensation. When the current number of insurance claims and 
legal actions ·.is considered, the question of true or 11faked 11 disabili-
ties becomes more of a problem. Hard neurological evidence of lingering 
damage is often absent or inconclusive and the reliability of the subjec-
tive evidence, if any, is called into further doubt. Even when damage 
is certain, the effects on a person•s performance are hard to determine. 
The present study examined the v~lue of a standardized neuropsychologi-
cal test battery for assisting in the differentiation of malingerers 
from brai,n-damaged patients. In this instance, the Luria-Nebraska Neuro-
psychological Battery (LNNB; Golden, Hammeke, & Purisch, 1980) was used 
because of the many claims of its utility in the general diagnosis of 
brain injury and, its ability to designate specific areas of cortical in-
volvement. 
The results of the present study provide overall support for the 
LNNB 1 s validity and ability to discriminate between malingerersandbrain-
damaged individuals. Individuals with closed head injury theoretically' 
should produce performance profiles with numerous deficits (many scales 
over the critical level) characteristic of diffuse cortical involvement. 
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This was indeed the case. The pattern of deficits shown by this particu-
lar brain-damaged group was certainly not striking. Almost all of the 
scales were above the critical level with no particular deficits appar-
ent; the mean t-scores for the brain-damaged group ranged from a t-score 
of 57 to a t-score of 70. 
It was found that malingerers do perform differently from brain-
damaged patients on many of the scales from the battery. The localiza-
tion scales, however, seem to be superior to the. summary scales for dis-
criminating the characteristic pattern of performance of the two groups. 
The malingerers performed markedly better, in general, than the closed 
head injury group. Most deficits were seen in the sensory-motor and 
right hemispheric areas with few deficits appearing on any of the other 
scales. Though the localization scales seemed better, in general, than 
the summary scales for differentiating the malingerers from the brain-
damaged group, the Expressive Speech and Receptive Speech Scales when 
compared with the other summary scales showed a relatively clear pattern 
of faking. The elevations of those two scales were very low while the 
other summary scales had much higher elevations. This type of profile 
would not likely be produced by an individual with a closed head injury. 
The head-injured patient would be more likely to show similar levels of 
problems across all scales rather than a greatly superior performance on 
scales thought to measure verbal abilities. Generally, the malingerers 
produced fewer and less severe deficits than the brain-damaged patients. 
An examination of the summary score profiles produced by the malin-
gerers and the closed head injury patients supports the notion that ma-
lingerers perform in a characteristically different way from brain-injur-
ed individuals. However, with a r.eanalysis of the profile scores 
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converted to deviations from critical level (which corrects for the dif-
ferences in age and education created by combining the brain-damaged 
groups), the differences were clearer and suggested a distinctive malin-
gered pattern of performance. 
The malingerers performed similarly to the closed head injury sam-
ple on tasks which tapped into generally lower cortical functioning and/ 
or right hemispheric functions. The malingerers did a relatively good 
job of faking on the sensory-motor and rhythmic/musical tasks, for exam-
ple. The exception to this faking pattern produced by the malingerers 
was the similar performance of both groups on the Intellectual Processes, 
Writing, and Arithmetic Scales. Golden et al. (1980) have pointed out 
the significant effects of age and education on the Writing and Arith-
metic Scales. Neither scale is included when the number of scales above 
critical level is considered in determining the likelihood of the pres-
ence of brain injury. These scales then are not considered good indica-
tors of brain damage. These results would suggest they may also be in-
appropriate for differentiating real brain damage from malingering be-
cause of the effect of age and education on performance. 
The similarity in performance of the two groups on the Intellectual 
Processes Scale is somewhat more difficult to explain as it strays from 
the supposition that malingerers cannot fake well on tasks involving 
higher cortical functions. However, as was pointed out earlier, the sum-
mary scales are heterogeneous and bhis contrasting result may be reflec-
tive of that heterogeneity. The Intellectual Processes items are likely 
to tap into many areas, not just that of higher cortical processes. 
The malingerers, generally, performed differently from the closed-
head injury patients on tasks which involve language and memory functions. 
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Normal individuals appear relatively unable to fake deficits characteris-
tic of damage to the left hemisphere and other higher cortical areas. 
One of the most striking differences between the two groups was that 
of the Pathognomonic Scale scores. This scale consists of 32 measures 
(items from the LNNB summary scales) which are considered to be the most 
effective indicators of brain damage when scored as 112''. The malinger-
ers rarely achieved less than normal performance on any of those items. 
This lends further support to this scale's ability to assist in the diag-
nosis of the presence of brain injury. With two minor exceptions, the 
malingerers did not perform as poorly on any of the scales as the actual 
patIents. 
The localization scales provide still more support for the assump-
tion that malingerers are un~ble to fake left hemispheric and higher cor-
tical deficits. Malingerers performed differently and, in all cases, not 
as poorly as the closed head injury patients on the left and right fron-
tal, left parietal-occipital, and left temporal scales. These results 
again suggest that the scale items which require higher level functions 
are better at discriminating fakers from brain-damaged individuals. How-
ever, higher cortical functions are not necessarily limited to any speci-
fic area of the brain. One could argue that the right temporal and pari-
etal lobes also involve higher cortical functions; therefore, the above 
conclusion should be considered tentative. 
The left and right sensory-motor, right parietal occipital, and 
right temporal scales did not differentiate the malingerers from the 
brain-damaged patients. This suggests that sensory-motor and general 
right hemispheric functions are more susceptible to faking. 
The results produced by the analyiis of the lateralization scales 
are inconsistent with those of the localization and summary scales men-
tioned earlier. Malingerers performed similarly to the brain-damaged 
group on the L* but differently on the R* scale. This would seem confus-
ing but Golden et al. (1981) have emphasized the relative inferiority of 
these empirically derived scales to the localization scales for lateral-
izing injuries. In the present study, they also appear to be less use-
ful. Different results were found recently in a study independent of the 
Golden research group (Sears, Hirt, & Hall, 1984). These investigators 
found the R* and L* Scales to be superior to the localization and sum-
mary scales for lateralizing injuries. 
Overall support was provided for the general ability of the LNNB to 
differentiate normal individuals from those with brain damage. None of 
the scale t-scores of the normal group approached its critical level. 
This suggests the LNNB is .a valid instrument as it successfully differen-
tiated normals from brain-damaged patients in every instance. 
The older and younger brain-damaged patients originally expected to 
produce different prof)les did not differ in performance on any scale. 
Older patients are typically considered to have difficulties of a more 
chronic nature and generally be more severely affected by the trauma of 
the injury than younger patients. This assumption led to the initial 
division of the brain-damaged patients into an older and younger group. 
However, at least in this particular sample, this assumption was unwar-
ranted. Both groups showed a wide range of similar deficits. Older pa-
tients did not appear to be more severely affected than younger patients. 
This being the case, the two groups were combined to form one brain-
damaged group with which to compare the normal and malingering groups. 
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Though the results are promising, the present study was not without 
its problems and therefore one must be circumspect in drawing concl'u-
sions. The malingerers were not brain-damaged and were not involved in 
an insurance claim or court action. It may be that given additional in-
centives, i.e., monetary gain instead of extra credit points, the malin-
gerers might have done a better job of faking. Additionally, the malin-
gerers were not given any information as to how closed head injury pa-
tients behave or what kind of problems they might have. If more speci-
fic instructions had been provided, the malingerers again might have 
been more proficient at faking. However, the fakers were successful in 
elevating their scores on all scales. Though many of their performances 
were not significantly different from those of the normal, nonmalinger-
ing subjects, their scores were consistently higher. With sophistica-
tion (i.e., more detailed instructions), the fakers could conceivably be 
quite good at faking brain damage on a neuropsychological test. 
Though the experimenter was 11 blind 11 to tHe type of instructions each 
subject received, it was assumed that since the subject was a university 
undergraduate, he/she was not brain-injured. Consequently, some experi-
menter bias may be present in the results. Finally, the brain-damaged 
patients were a heterogeneous group even though all had suffered closed 
head injuries. They came from various parts of the United States, were 
tested by different technicians, and were likely to be quite different 
from the undergraduate sample. Again, these differences may color the 
results. Had the brain-damaged patients been a more homogeneous group 
from the immediate geographical area and more 1 ike the undergraduates, 
different results could have been obtained. 
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The similarity of these results and those of the Heaton et al. (1978) 
study examining the Halstead-Reitan battery's value for detecting fakers 
is promising. Those investigators also found a tendency for malingerers 
to perform poorly on motor and sensory tasks but to do relatively well 
on cognitive tasks. This would appear to provide more support for the 
comparability of the LNNB to the more widely used Halstead-Reitan bat-
tery. Additional confidence may also be extended to the analysis of per-
formance patterns and with that, the utility of standardized neuropsycho-
logical batteries. 
There are a number of hypotheses which could be proffered in an at-
tempt to explain these results. Because of the exploratory nature of 
the present study, any far-reaching or broad conclusions would be inap-
propriate but several interesting possibiliti·es can be considered. One 
such possibility is generated by considering the past history of the sub-
jects. It is unlikely that many of them had had experience with the be-
havior of brain-damaged individuals. Secondly, the subjects were:not 
given specific information as to exactly what to do in the testing situa-
tion in order to accurately fake their performances. They were merely 
told to perform in the way in which a brain-damaged person might perform. 
These subjects probably had little idea of how to behave because of their 
lack of experience with brain-injured people. They may have found it 
easier to perform poor 1 y on sensory-motor tasks rather than on i nte 11 ec-
tual tasks or, perhaps, did not know they should perform poorly on lan-
guage and cognitive tasks. The assumption might be made that deficits 
in a sensory-motor modality are more obvious and/or easier to fake than 
those in the cognitive modality. 
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In this particular instance, it seemed especially difficult for the 
faking subjects to perform poorly (fake) on the more verbally oriented 
i terns. Their scores on the Expressive Speech and Receptive Speech Sea 1 es 
were quite low and did not differ significantly from the scores of the 
normal, nonfaking subjects. The depressed elevations {good performance) 
on those two summary scales when compared with the higher elevations on 
the other 11 summary scales seemed to be quite chanacteristic of the fak-
ing pattern. Not only could this be helpful in identifying a person who 
might be faking, but it provides some support for the continued use of 
the somewhat controversial summary scales of the LNNB. 
It could also be concluded that the faking subjects were not attempt-
ing to fake. Closer examination of their scale scores shows a consis-
tently poorer (higher scores) performance than that of the normal. non-
faking subjects across all scales. It is suggested then that because 
the faking subjects were not given specific instructions as to how to per-
form, they did not know what to do in order to successfully fake on ver-
bal items. When the malingering subjects missed verbal items, it was 
typically in an obvious manner rather than what might be expected in the 
performance of a head-injured patient. For example, one subject when 
asked to name a particular item, identified a pencil as a barbell. A 
brain-damaged person would be more likely to respond that the same item 
was a pen or might only be able to identify its use (i.e.,you'write with 
it) and not be able to name it. 
Because the subjects attempting to fake apparently did not recog-
nize the subtleties of the residual deficits of a closed head injury, 
they did not know what to do and either responded automatically with the 
correct response or answered with an absurd and/or obvious response. 
Ll] 
During the debriefing of each subject, many of the fakers reported an in-
ability to prevent a correct verbal response. 
The present study was an exploration of the utility of a standard-
ized neuropsychological test battery in detecting malingerers. Consider-
ing the results obtained here and in the Heaton et al. (1978) stuc;iy, it 
may be possible to identify malingerers by examining their patterns of 
performance. A closed head injury patient would be expected to exhibit 
a large number of deficits whereas a malingerer might be expected to 
showa limited number of difficulties (i.e., poor performance on the 
sensory-motor tasks with near normal performance on cognitive tasks). 
The LNNB appears to be a valid diagnostic tool useful in discerningthese 
patterns. Malingerers do produce a characteristic profile on the LNNB 
different from that of a closed head injury patient. The malingered pro-
files resemble more f'oca1 than diffuse damage. 
In referring to personality measures, Meehl and Hathaway (1980) have 
pointed out the inherent susceptibility of structured tests to "faking 11 
or 11 lying. 11 This susceptibility also exists in structured neuropsycho-
logical tests. The results of the present study are promising in that 
it appears possible to identify those who are faking~ explain why the 
particular pattern of faking might occur, and thus reduce this suscep-
tibility. Without a theoretically supported test such as the LNNB to 
assist in the integration and clarification of brain-behavior relation-
ships, fewer and less reasonable explanations could be offered for the 
relatively consistent results of the present study. 
It would seem thatthe criticism leveled at the LNNB concerning the 
intrascale heterogeneity of the summary scales (e.g., Crosson & Warren. 
1982; Delis & Kaplan, 1983) is warranted as conflicting results are 
\ 
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difficult to explain without examination of the individual items. This 
type of examination, though often helpful, is likely to be not only time-
consuming and tedious but it departs from the concept of pattern analysis 
(e.g., Lewis et al., 1979) and standardization of the LNNB (Golden, Ham-
meke, & Purisch, 1980). Without question, additional research is needed 
before firm conclusions can be offered. But a pattern may be emerging 
which eventually may give the clinician evidence more objective than in-
tuition with which to base his/her diagnoses. 
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MEAN T-SCORES AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR 
BRA I N-DM1AGED AND FAKING GROUPS 
GrouE! 
Brain-Damaged 
(n = 32) 
Variable Mean SD 
Motor 66.66 19.80 
Rhythm 66.75 16.59 
Tact i 1 e 60.82 19.06 
Visual 56.58 1 2. 12 
Receptive Speech 62.01 18.37 
Expressive Speech 58.58 16.80 
Reading 59.45 11 . 56 
Writing 65.89 13.80 
Arithmetic 67.61 22.43 
Memory 62.75 9.62 
Intellectual Processes 65.76 16.73 
Pathognomonic 65.32 17.54 
Left Hemisphere 59.63 15.80 
Right Hemisphere 68.25 31.17 
Left Frontal 63.83 15.05 
Left Sensory-Motor 59.18 12.89 
Left Parietal Occipita 1 62.60 14.88 
Left Temporal 57.92 12.24 
Right Frontal 62.42 11 . 54 
Right Sensory-Motor 62.25 13.25 
Right Parietal Occipital 69.48 19.59 
Right Temporal 62.85 11 . 1 9 
l '~ 60.87 13.44 
R''~ 61 . 67 1 5. 11 
*''~E. < 0.05. 
Faking 




57.94 11 "85 
51.50 10.57 
42. 51 8. 967b~ 




47.92 11 . 39'b~ 
56.85 10.64 . 
47.513 8.?7H 
61 .08 18.88 
60.98 12.40 
49.17 7. 86'~* 
55.08 1 0. 057't7't 
49.55 7.93H 
43.78 7.11~·o~~ 
50.83 8. 27''~'~ 
52.93 7, 32Mt 
55.22 10.337h't 
54.00 8. 087't7't 
52.81 9.33 
48.00 7.12 7'~* 
TABLE II 
MEAN T-SCORES AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR 
BRAIN-DAMAGED AND NORMAL GROUPS 
Graue 
Brain-Damaged 
{n = 32) 
Variable Mean so 
Motor 66.66 19.80 
Rhythm 66.75 16.59 
Tactile 60.82 19.06 
Visual 56.58 12. 1 2 
Receptive Speech 62.01 18.37 
Expressive Speech 58.58 16.80 
Reading 59.45 11 . 56 
Writing 65.89 13.80 
Arithmetic 67.61 22.43 
Memory 62.75 9.62 
Intellectual Processes 65.76 16.73 
Pathognomonic 65.32 17.54 
Left Hemisphere 59.63 15.80 
Right Hemisphere 68.25 31 . 17 
Left Frontal 63.83 15.05 
Left Sensory-Motor 59.18 12.89 
Left Parietal Occipital 62.60 14.88 
Left Temporal 57.92 12.24 
Right Frontal 62.42 11 . 54 
Right Sensory-Motor 62.25 13.25 
Right Parietal Occipital 69.48 19.59 
Right Temporal 62.85 11. 19 
v· " 60.87 13.44 
R* 61 .67 1 5. 11 
;'t*E.. < 0.05. 
56 
Normal 
(n = 1 5l 
Mean so 
39.34 5. 18~b't 
41 • 58 11 . 86~:~'t 
41 . 08 s. so~t'i't 
43.35 6. oz~b~ 
37.53 3. 39~b': 
37.23 5 . 28~'t~'t 
44.57 5. 50~'t~: 
52.35 6. 72*~~ 
43.87 5. 18'i't* 
38.07 4. 97*''t 
47.85 6. 59'h't 
38.21 4. 69'b't 
41 . 73 5.32~'t'~ 
3R.86 4. 37~:* 
40.67 3. 75'~''t 
43.08 6. l9''o~ 
43.45 5. 4 7''t7' 
40.56 4. 53~b~ 
41 . 17 5. J6·H 
45.73 6. 5Q;'<~'t 
41.78 s. 53·,~1: 
46.00 4. 28*'~ 
39.63 3. 70''d: 
36.81 5. 09M: 
TABLE Ill 
MEAN T-SCORES AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR 
NORMAL AND FAKING GROUPS 
Groue 
Normal 
(n = 15) 
Va r i ab 1 e Mean so 
Motor 39.34 5. 18 
Rhythm 41 .48 11 . 86 
Tact i 1 e 41 .08 5.50 
Visual 43.35 6.02 
Receptive Speech 37.53 3.39 
Expressive Speech 37.23 5.28 
Reading 44.57 5. 50 
Writing 52.35 6. 72 
Arithmetic 43.87 5' 18 
Memory 38.07 4.97 
Intellectual Processes 47.85 6.59 
Pathognomonic 38.21 4.69 
Left Hemisphere 41 . 73 5.32 
Right Hemisphere 38.86 4.37 
Left Frontal 40.67 3.75 
Left Sensory-Motor 43.08 6. 19 
Left Parietal Occipital 43.45 5.47 
Left Temporal 40.56 4. 53 
Right Frontal 41.17 5. 16 
Right Sensory-Motor 45.73 6.50 
Right Parietal Occipital 41.78 5~58 
Right Temporal 46.00 4.28 
L i'c- 39.63 3.70 
R~"" 36.81 5.09 
~"'"£.. < 0. 05. 
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Faking 
(n = 15) 
Mean so 
56.37 13..8J~b~ 
59.76 20. 64*~~ 







47.92 11 . 39** 
56.85 10.64 
47.58 8. 77 
61 .08 18. 88~~* 
60.98 12. 4o~:-* 
49. 17 7.86 
55.08 10.05*~~ 
49.55 7.93 
43.78 7. II 








MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR DEVIATIONS FROM CRITICAL 
LEVEL FOR BRAIN-DAMAGED AND FAKING GROUPS 
Grou~ 
Brain-Damaged Faking 
(n = 32) (n = 15) 
Variable Mean SD Mean SD 
Motor 7.88 19.58 I. 13 13.66 
Rhythm 7.97 16.49 4.52 19.59 
Tactile 2.04 19.50 2.70 11 . 56 ' 
Visual -2.20 12. 77 -3.74 10.00 
Recept~ve Speech 3.23 17.66 -12.73 8. 17-ld; 
Expressive Speech -0.20 15.91 -13.09 7.12** 
Reading 0.67 11 . 45 -8.36 7.41** 
Writing 7. 1 1 13.88 0.50 7.33 
Arithmetic 8.83 22.02 -2.34 11 . 37 
Memory 3.97 9.47 -7.32 11 . 23~~~'t 
Intellectual Processes 6.98 16.44 l. 61 1 0. 31 
Pathognomonic 6.54 16.97 -7.66 7 • 95~H 
Left Hemisphere 0.85 15.48 5. 84 18.99 
Right Hemisphere 9.47 31 . 6 7 5.74 12.07 
Left Frontal 5.05 14.69 -6.07 7. 39~b~ 
Left Sensory-Motor 0.40 13.08 -0. 15 9.57 
Left Parietal Occipital 3.82 14.59 -5.68 7. 65*~~ 
Left Temporal -0.86 1 1 . 19 -11.46 6. 61 ~~* 
Right Frontal 3.64 10.99 -4.40 7. 89~~~'t 
Right Sensory-Motor 3.4 7 13.05 -2.30 6.90 
Right Parietal Occipital 10.70 20.00 -0.01 9.61 
Right Temporal 4.07 11 • 24 -1 . 24 7.39 
L '~ 2.09 13.27 -2.42 8.86 
R~'t 2.87 15.05 -7.23 6.63~'d; 
*~~£. < 0. 0 5. 
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TABLE V 
MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR DEVIATIONS FROM CRITICAL 
LEVEL FOR NORMAL AtiD FAKING GROUPS 
Group 
Normal Faking 
(n = 15) (n == 15) 
Variable Mean so Mean SD 
Motor -16.97 . 5.24 1. 13 13.66*~~ 
Rhythm 
-14.74 11 . 64 4.52 19.59** 
Tactile -15.23 5.37 2.70 11 . 56** 
Vi sua 1 -12.96 5.97 -3.74 10.00 
Receptive Speech -18.78 3.69 -12.73 8. 17 
Expressive Speech -19.08 5.48 -13.09 7. 12 
Reading 
-11 . 74 5.56 -8.36 7.41 
Writing 
-3.96 6.92 0.50 7.33 
Arithmetic -12.44 5.37 -2.34 11 . 37 
Memory -18.24 4.83 -7.32 11 . 23*~·~ 
Intellectual Processes -8.46 6. 51 1.61 1 0. 31 
Pathognomonic -18.11 4.82 -7.66 7.95 
Left Hemisphere -14.58 5.03 5.84 18.99*~~ 
Right Hemisphere 
-17.45 4.46 5.74 12.07~h~ 
Left Frontal 
-15.65 3.92 -6.07 7-39 
Left Sensory-Motor 
-13.23 6.09 -o. 15 9.57** 
Left Parietal Occipital -12.87 5.46 -5.68 7.65 
Left Temporal 
-15.76 4.49 -11 . 46 6. 61 
Right Frontal 
-15.15 5.37 -4.40 7. 89~h~ 
Right Sensory-Motor 
-10.58 6.55 -2.30 6.90 
Right Parietal Occipital -14.54 5.63 -0.01 9.61** 
Right Temporal 
-10.31 4.24 -1 • 24 7. 39~b~ 
l* -16.68 3. 80 -2.42 8.86** 
R~~ 
-19.50 5.32 -7.23 6. 63*~~ 
~'o'~.E. < o.os. 
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TABLE VI 
MEANS AND STAN'DARD DEVIATIONS FOR DEVIATIONS FROM CRITICAL 
LEVEL FOR BRAIN-DAMAGED AND NORMAL GROUPS 
Groue 
Brain-Damaged Normal 
(n = 32) (n = 15) 
Variable Mean so Mean so 
Motor 7.88 19.58 -16.97 5.24** 
Rhythm 7.97 16.49 -14.74 11 .64** 
Tact i 1 e 2.04 19.50 -15.23 5.37** 
Visual -2.20 12.77 -12.96 5. 97*,'t 
Receptive Speech 3.23 17.66 -18.78 3.69 ' 
Expressive Speech -0.20 15.91 -19.08 5.48** 
Reading 0.67 11 .4 5 -11 • 74 5.56** 
Writing 7. 11 13.88 -3.96 6.92** 
Arithmetic 8.83 22.02 -1.2.44 5.37** 
Memory 3.97 9.47 -18.24 4.83** 
Intellectual Processes 6.98 ' '16 .44 -8.46 6.51** 
Pathognomonic 6. 54 16.96 -18.11 4.82** 
Left Hemisphere 0.85 15.48 -14.58 5.03** 
Right Hemisphere 9.47 31 .67 -17.45 4.46** 
Left Frontal s.os 14.69 -15.65 3.92** 
Left Sensory-Motor 0.40 13.08 -13.23 6 .09,'t* 
Left Parietal Occipital 3.82 14.59 -12.87 5.46** 
Left Temporal 
-0.86 11. 19 -15.76 4.49** 
Right Frontal 3.64 10.99 -15.15 5.37** 
Right Sensory-Motor 3.47 13.05 -10.58' 6.55** 
Right Parietal Occipital 10:.70 20.00 -14.54 5.63** 
Right Temporal 4.07 11 . 24 -10.31 4.24** 
L* 2. 09 13.27 -16.68 3.80** 
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I hereby voluntarily authorize Candace Conley (Researcher), Oklahoma 
State University, and such assistants that may be designated to perform 
the following study: 11Testing With the Luria-Nebraska Neuropsychologi-
cal Battery .•• 
I understand that if I have a history of brain injury,' I will not 
be allowed to participate in this study but I will receive the extra 
credit. 
I further understand that strict confidentiality will be observed 
of all data collected under the guidelines established by the Department 
of Psychology, Oklahoma State University. Complete anonymity (no names 
will be used) will be preserved and data will be released only to qual i-
fied professionals for scientific or training pu~poses. 
I further understand and agree that the data and information relat-
ed to and resulting from the study may be used for publication in scien-
tific journals but that my name shall not be used in association with 
these publications without my specific written permission. 
I understand that if, at any point, I wish to withdraw from the ex-
periment, I may do so without risk of losing the extra credit. 
By signing this consent form, I have not waived any of my legal 
rights or released this institution from 1 lability for negligence.,: .Should 
any problems arise during this study, I may take them to the Chairman, 
Research Committee: Dr. Robert ·Schlottmann, Fourth Floor, North Murray 
Hal 1, O.S.U., Phone: 624-6027. · 
I have read and understood this form. 
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